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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE LEGAL MECHANICS
AFTER ARREST AND INVESTIGATION
Ralph B. Kirscher
I.
The subject of criminal procedure contains numerous catego-
ries often assumed or dismissed without discussion; yet, one or more
such categories may affect the outcome of every suspected criminal
violation processed by law enforcement personnel. Thus, in order to
encourage the effective and efficient administration of criminal jus-
tice and to inform the practitioner of recent developments in post-
investigative aspects of criminal procedure, this article examines
selected cases of such categories considered by the Montana Su-
preme Court during the survey period.
II.
A. Speedy Trial
Barker v. Wingol is "[tihe touchstone in any analysis of the
speedy trial issue." 2 It suggests a balancing test which considers four
factors:3 (1) length of delay; (2) reason for delay; (3) assertion of the
right by the defendant; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. The
fourth factor consists of three interests of the defendant "which the
[fundamental] speedy trial right was designed to protect: (i) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety
and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired."'
Although the Montana Supreme Court has adopted the Barker
test in numerous cases,' it has not established a precise length of
delay creating presumptive prejudice. In Fitzpatrick v. Crist,' the
court held that a seven-month delay shifted to the state the burden
of explaining the reasons for delay and any absence of prejudice to
1. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
2. State ex rel. Briceno v. District Court, __ Mont. , , 568 P.2d 162, 164
(1977).
3. 407 U.S. at 530-32.
4. Id. at 532.
5. See, e.g., State v. Collins, - Mont. __, 582 P.2d 1179 (1978); State v. Cassidy,
- Mont. -, 578 P.2d 735 (1978); State ex rel. Briceno v. District court, - Mont. ,
568 P.2d 162 (1977); State v. Carden, - Mont. -, 566 P.2d 780 (1977); State v. Keller,
170 Mont. 372, 553 P.2d 1013 (1976); State ex rel. Sanford v. District Court, 170 Mont. 196,
551 P.2d 1005 (1976); State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178 (1975); Fitzpatrick v.
Crist, 165 Mont. 382, 528 P.2d 1322 (1974); and State ex rel. Thomas v. District Court, 151
Mont. 1, 438 P.2d 554 (1968).
6. 165 Mont. 382, 528 P.2d 1322 (1974).
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the defendant. That delay did not, however, create a violation of
defendant's right to a speedy trial. 7 The court required additional
inquiry into the other three factors to determine if a denial of the
right to a speedy trial occurred.8 Subsequent Montana cases have
followed Fitzpatrick.9
The court in State v. Cassidy'0 dismissed a criminal mischief
action delayed over a period of eight months. The state argued the
delay resulted from scheduling practices of the district court, lo-
cated in Missoula County. The supreme court concluded that the
state could not justify such a delay when "no progression towards
final disposition of the case occurred."" The delay consisted "pri-
marily of 'dead time.' "912
The court has distinguished time delays attributable to the
prosecution from those attributable to the defendant. In State v.
Collins, '3 the court affirmed a lower court conviction and held that
when a defendant delays his trial for purposes of investigation and
for personal reasons, such time will be charged against the defen-
dant and not the state." After subtracting the time charged against
the defendant from the total delay time, only a two-month delay
occurred. Two months "would hardly qualify as a prejudicial deter-
rent to defendant's fair and speedy trial, especially when in that
period defendant was 'planning to leave the state, and no prejudice
[was] shown to the defendant's rights."' 5
Moreover, as the court said in State v. Steward,'" "an accused
must take some affirmative action to obtain a trial to be entitled to
a discharge for delay."' 7 This affirmative action may be presented
by "objecting to adjournments of the trial, demanding a trial, or
7. Id. at 388, 528 P.2d at 1326.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., State v. Collins, - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 1179 (1978); State v. Cassidy,
- Mont. __, 578 P.2d 735 (1978); State ex rel. Briceno v. District Court, - Mont. -,
568 P.2d 162 (1977); State v. Keller, 170 Mont. 372, 553 P.2d 1013 (1976); and State v.
Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178 (1975).
10. - Mont. - , 578 P.2d 735 (1978).
11. Id. at , 578 P.2d at 738.
12. Id. at , 578 P.2d at 738 (citing State ex rel. Briceno v. District Court,__ Mont.
- -. 568 P.2d 162, 164 (1977)).
13. - Mont. -. , 582 P.2d 1179 (1978).
14. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 1186.
15. Id. See also, State v. Carden, Mont .... 566 P.2d 780,785 (1977).
The court, in State v. McKenzie, - Mont. - , 581 P.2d 1205 (1978), affirmed its earlier
holding in State v. McKenzie, - Mont. _, 557 P.2d 1023 (1976), that although a delay
of 305 days created a presumptive prejudice, the reasons for delay (defendant's several ap-
pearances, defendant's refusal to plead, complexity of the case, and the newness of applicable
law) removed any prejudicial effect.
16. 168 Mont. 385, 543 P.2d 178 (1975).
17. Id. at 390, 543 P.2d at 182.
[Vol. 40
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making an appropriate motion."" The court in Steward specified
that "[tihe 'appropriate motion' is a motion to dismiss for denial
of a speedy trial."" This motion should be asserted "prior to the
actual commencement of the trial, usually at the time the trial date
is set, or at the time the case is called to trial."' 0
When considering the fourth factor, prejudice, the court may
presume the requisite anxiety and concern of the defendant. In
Cassidy, "[t]wo felony counts of criminal mischief carrying a maxi-
mum penalty of twenty years" with corresponding prosecutorial
"dead time" created the presumption of anxiety and concern." If
the defendant creates the delay, the court is unlikely to create the
presumption. In Collins, delays occurred when the prosecution ac-
commodated the defendant's requests for personal business trips,
personal surgery and pretrial investigation. Because anxiety and
concern "were as much the result of the needs of the defendant, as
of any delay in the speedy trial process," the court refused to recog-
nize a presumption of anxiety and concern. 2
The remaining two interests, oppressive incarceration and de-
fense impairment, contained in the factor of prejudice may be diffi-
cult to assert. If the defendant is released on bail immediately or a
short time after arrest or arraignment, the possibility of prejudice
for oppressive incarceration is very slight." The third interest, de-
fense impairment, may be established if the delay contributed to
the possibility of memory lapses. The court in Steward stated:
It is difficult to determine whether defendant would be prejudiced
due to impairment of his defense [if] there has been no trial or
witness testimony which might indicate a loss of memory regarding
events of the distant past. The prosecution might also have its case
impaired due to the loss of memory of its witnesses, but the greater
danger of prejudice exists for an innocent defendant who might,
through lapse of time, be unable to accurately recall events in a
certain day when there was no remarkable or memorable occurr-
ences to etch the memory of the day in his mind.2'
Certainly the type and degree of crime will influence a court in
determining how remarkable or memorable the event is and how
well-etched the event should be in the defendant's mind.
The supreme court refused to consider the speedy trial issue in
18. Id. (citing United States v. Research Foundation, 155 F. Supp. 650, 654 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
19. Id. at 390-91, 543 P.2d at 182.
20. Id.
21. - Mont. at _ 578 P.2d at 740.
22. - Mont. at -, 582 P.2d at 1187.
23. State v. Steward, 168 Mont. 385, 393, 543 P.2d 178, 183 (1975).
24. Id. at 393-94, 543 P.2d at 183.
19791
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two recent cases: Bretz v. Crist15 and In re Hart." In Bretz, the court
held a defendant could not use a writ of habeas corpus to argue a
speedy trial claim when another pending appeal included that
claim. "[Any error in a criminal trial, which is reviewable on
appeal from the conviction, will not be considered in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding."" In Hart, the defendant contested extradition pro-
ceedings by raising a speedy trial claim in a habeas corpus petition.
The court said, however, that a habeas corpus petition is appro-
priate only to consider issues related to the legality or illegality of
defendant's imprisonment, confinement or restraint, rather than
the deprivation of other constitutional rights.21 In extradition pro-
ceedings, the issue of violation of a constitutional right, such as the
right to speedy trial, "is properly cognizable only in the demanding
state and not in the state of asylum. Petitioner's remedy is to raise
this question in [the demanding state].""9
Regarding misdemeanors, the court considered the speedy trial
issue in State v. Nelson.3 Even though a trial is delayed beyond the
statutory limit of six months, valid reasons may satisfy the "good
cause" requirement of Montana Code Annotated [hereinafter cited
as MCA], § 46-13-201(2) (1978),'31 and preclude dismissal of the
case. The court in Nelson concluded that the following reasons con-
stituted "good cause": (1) defendant's motions to dismiss the action
and suppress the evidence; (2) defendant's motions for substitution
of the judge; and (3) the judge's illness.32 Most, if not all, of the
delay could be attributed to defendant's action. Again, as in felony
cases, the court closely scrutinized the reasons for delay and pre-
cluded dismissal where defendant's actions caused a substantial
portion of the delay.
B. Bail
A law enforcement officer may set bail (bond) without referring
to a bond schedule established by a judicial officer. In State v.
25. No. 14209 (Mont. July 13, 1978) (35 St. Rep. 990 (1978)).
26. - Mont. -, 583 P.2d 411 (1978).
27. 35 St. Rep. at 991.
28. - Mont. at -, 583 P.2d at 418-19.
29. Id. at __, 583 P.2d at 421.
30. - Mont. -, 583 P.2d 435 (1978).
31. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED [hereinafter cited as MCA], § 46-13-201(2) (1978) (for-
merly codified at REviSED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], §
95-1703(2) (Supp. 1977)) provides:
(2) The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the prosecu-
tion to be dismissed if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed upon his
application is not brought to trial within 6 months after entry of plea upon a
complaint, information, or indictment charging a misdemeanor.
32. - Mont. at - 583 P.2d at 438.
[Vol. 40
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Sawyer,3 an undersheriff arrested the defendant for reckless driving
and improper vehicle registration and set the defendant's bonds at
$100 and $25, respectively, without referring to a bond schedule.
The supreme court overruled the district court decision and held
"that a peace officer may. . . rely on his everyday experience and
memory in accepting bond in behalf of a magistrate.""4 The court,
however, qualified its decision: "[t]here was no evidence that bond
accepted by the officer in the instant case was any different from
that listed in the bond schedule." Therefore, if a law enforcement
officer sets bail in an amount contrary to the established schedule,
a possible illegal detainer action could occur. Before the court would
allow such an action, the differences between the amount set by the
officer and that determined by the schedule probably would have
to be so extreme as to hinder the efficient administration of justice.
C. Competency of the Accused
The Montana Supreme Court has adopted two standards for
considering the affirmative defense of mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility." These standards are (1) at trial, a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and (2) at pretrial hearing, a "plain and
obvious" defect leaving no room for a difference of opinion among
reasonable minds.
In State v. Hagerud,17 the court stated: "The standard of proof
required [in a pretrial proceeding in the defense of mental defect
33. - Mont. _ 571 P.2d 1131 (1977).
34. Id. at -, 571 P.2d at 1132.
35. Id.
36. MCA § 46-14-201(1) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-503(a)) pro-
vides:
(1) Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense
which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.
MCA § 46-14-211 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-507(1) (Supp. 1977)) pro-
vides:
If the report filed under 46-14-203 finds that the defendant at the time of the
criminal conduct charged suffered from a mental disease or defect which rendered
him unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law and the court, after a hearing if a hearing is requested
by the attorney prosecuting or the defendant, is satisfied that the mental disease
or defect was sufficient to exclude responsibility the court on motion of the defen-
dant shall enter judgment of acquittal on the ground of mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility.
The Revised Commission Comment to MCA § 46-14-211 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M.
1947, § 95-507) states:
Under [MCA § 46-14-211 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-507(1)
(Supp. 1977)] in cases of extreme mental disease or defect where the exclusion of
responsibility is clear trial can be avoided and the defendant immediately commit-
ted as irresponsible.
See notes 37 through 44, infra and accompanying textual discussion.
37. - Mont. - , 570 P.2d 1131 (1978).
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excluding responsibility] is proof such as to leave no room for a
difference of opinion among reasonable minds."" This standard pre-
cludes a judge from basing his belief "upon a mere preponderance
of the evidence."3 The Hagerud standard clarifies the prior stan-
dard adopted in State ex rel. Krutzfeldt v. District Court:"0
[Iff, in the judge's opinion and after a hearing if requested by
either attorney, a defendant was clearly suffering from mental dis-
ease at the time of the crime then the judge can acquit the defen-
dant and have him committed to a state institution forthwith. The
purpose is plain-to avoid a costly trial where the mental defect
is plain and obvious.41
The "plain and obvious" standard, as interpreted in Hagerud, re-
quires "proof such as to leave no room for a difference of opinion
among reasonable minds.' 2 Such a standard, therefore, is synon-
omous with "beyond a reasonable doubt." The court reached this
conclusion in State ex rel. Nelson v. District Court,"3 when it consid-
ered whether the preponderance of evidence standard should control
both at the pretrial hearing and at the trial. The court stated:
At this stage of the process, [the pretrial hearing], . . . , the
question is not one of the preponderance of the evidence, but
whether the exclusion of criminal responsibility due to mental dis-
ease or defect is "plain and obvious". If it is not plain and obvious,
a trial should be conducted and the trier of fact can determine the
preponderance of the evidence. The summary procedure outlined
by section [46-14-211] was never designed to replace the trial
where the issue of criminal responsibility is disputable. In
Krutzfeldt this Court held this procedure does not preclude a
defendant from raising the defense of mental disease or defect at
trial. Such a holding would be unnecessary if the standard of proof
at the hearing was equivalent to the standard at trial."
The effect of these two standards is to create a legal tension between
a "preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable
doubt." The burden mandated in MCA § 46-14-201(1) (1978)0
specifically requires the defendant to establish an affirmative de-
fense by a preponderance of the evidence. On the other hand, MCA
§ 46-14-211 (1978)" is construed to require a defendant to establish
38. Id. at _, 570 P.2d at 1136.
39. Id.
40. 163 Mont. 164, 515 P.2d 1312 (1973).
41. Id. at 170, 515 P.2d at 1315.
42. - Mont. at -, 570 P.2d at 1136.
43. __ Mont. __, 566 P.2d 1382 (1977).
44. Id. at -, 566 P.2d at 1384-85.
45. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-503(a).
46. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-507(1) (Supp. 1977).
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the same defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Model Penal Code, §§ 4.01(1) and 4.07, is the source
document for MCA § 46-14-201(1) (1978)" and MCA § 46-14-211
(1978)" respectively. In section 4.03 of the code, no reference is
made to the required burden of proof. The Montana legislature,
however, in adopting the Montana code of criminal procedure,
amended section 4.03 to include the preponderance of evidence
standard.' The legislature adopted section 4.07 without amend-
ment. It provides:
If the report filed . . . finds the defendant at the time of the
criminal conduct charged suffered from a mental disease or defect
[excluding responsibility] . . . .and the court .. .is satisfied,
the court shall enter judgment of acquittal . . .0
In construing section 46-14-211, the court has relied upon the follow-
ing Revised Commission Comment:5
Under [section 46-14-211] in cases of extreme mental disease or
defect where the exclusion of responsibility is clear, trial can be
avoided and the defendant committed as irresponsible.52
The words "clear" and "clearly" are associated with the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard. 3 The Commission Comment, by using
the word "clear," suggests a standard inconsistent with the amount
of evidence required to "satisfy" a court under section 46-14-211
when section 46-14-201(1) specifically mandates a "preponderance
of evidence" standard.
D. Counsel
Joint representation of codefendants is not a per se violation of
the constitutional .guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, ac-
cording to the United States Supreme Court case of Holloway v.
Arkansas .54 That case held, however, that a constitutional violation
does occur when defense counsel repeatedly requests separate coun-
sel on the grounds of codefendant's conflicting interests and the trial
47. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-503(a).
48. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-507(1) (Supp. 1977).
49. Section 4.03(1) of the Model Penal Code states:
Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense.
MCA § 46-14-201(1) (1978) provides:
Mental disease or defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative defense which
the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence.
50. See note 1, supra for full text (emphasis added).
51. This comment accompanies R.C.M. 1947, § 95-507.
52. Emphasis added.
53. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DiSORDER AS A CIMINAL DEFENSE 222-26 (1954).
54. 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178 (1978).
19791
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court fails "either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate
steps to ascertain whether the risk was too remote." If "a trial
court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection,
reversal is automatic""6 for two reasons:
(1) joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect
[because of] what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain
from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea
negotiations and in the sentencing process; and
(2) an inquiry of harmless error. . . would require. . . unguided
speculation .5
If the defense counsel requests separate counsel for codefendants,
deference should be given to such a request.5
What happens if the defense counsel does nothing to advise the
trial court of actual or possible conflicting interests between the
codefendants? The Court, in dicta, identifies two issues relevant to
such an inquiry:
(1) How strong a showing of conflict must be made, or how cer-
tain the reviewing court must be that the asserted conflict existed;
and
(2) the scope and nature of the affirmative duty by the trial judge
to assure that the defendants are not deprived of their right to
counsel .5
If codefendants are represented by the same counsel, "the trial
judge should inquire into potential conflicts which may jeopardize
the right of each defendant to the fidelity of his counsel."60
The Montana Supreme Court considered the impact joint rep-
resentation has on a codefendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel in State v. Henry." Henry involved two defendants charged
with the criminal possession of drugs for which one defendant re-
ceived a heavier sentence than the other. The defendant receiving
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1181.
57. Id. at 1182.
58. Id. at 1179. The court identified three considerations which should be acknowl-
edged:
(1) an attorney representing two defendants is in the best position professionally
and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop
in a trial;
(2) defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovery of a conflict of interest,
to advise the court at once of the problem; and
(3) attorneys are officers of the court, and when they address the judge solemnly
upon a matter before the court their declarations are virtually made under oath.
Id. at 1179-80.
59. Id. at 1178.
60. Id., n.6.
61. - Mont. __, 582 P.2d 321 (1978).
[Vol. 40
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the heavier sentence claimed in a post conviction relief petition that
her sentence resulted because counsel could not effectively repre-
sent both defendants. The record in the case disclosed no challenge
to joint representation; in fact, the same counsel represented the
defendant on appeal. The court held where one codefendant volun-
tarily exculpated the other and both intelligently acquiesced in joint
representation, "the strategies. . . for both. . .[during plea bar-
gaining and sentencing] were not in coriflict." 2
Another aspect of right to counsel cases is the selection of court-
appointed counsel. In this regard, the leading United States Su-
preme Court case, Faretta v. California," held that a criminal de-
fendant has a constitutional right to have court-appointed counsel
dismissed and to proceed without counsel if he voluntarily and intel-
ligently decides to do so." The Montana Supreme Court has refused
to extend the Faretta rule. The court in State v. Pepperling" held
that a defendant could not choose the court-appointed attorney he
wanted. "No case so far concedes that right . . . .His right to
counsel does not include the right to select an attorney of his own
choosing . . .or require that the particular attorney must be ap-
proved by the defendant."" If his court-appointed counsel is render-
ing effective assistance of counsel, the defendant has two choices:
"(1) [continue] with the counsel so appointed, or (2) [have] his
counsel dismissed and [proceed] on [his] own, pro se."1
The defendant's general statement that "me and [my attor-
ney] don't see eye to eye""8 is insufficient to establish ineffective
assistance of counsel. Implicit in the court's holding is the concern
for the efficient and economic administration of justice while pre-
serving a defendant's constitutional rights. To allow a defendant to
dismiss qualified, appointed counsel at will would burden the judi-
cial system with unnecessary delay and expense.
Three recent cases considered conduct of an attorney during the
trial: State v. Bain," State v. Thompson,70 and Murphy v. Crist."1
In Murphy, the defendant argued that the defense counsel was im-
properly prepared to refute the prosecution's instructions on aiding
and abetting. The court, however, summarily dismissed his argu-
62. Id. at , 582 P.2d at 324.
63. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
64. Id. at 835.
65. - Mont. __, 582 P.2d 341 (1978).
66. Id. at __, 582 P.2d at 36.
67. Id.
68. Id. at __, 582 P.2d at 342.
69. - Mont. -, 575 P.2d 919 (1978).
70. - Mont..., 576 P.2d 1105 (1978).
71. No. 14252 (Mont. July 21, 1978) (35 St. Rep. 1054 (1978.)).
19791
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ment by stating: "[Wihile it is true that counsel did not object to
the instructions with any degree of specificity. we note that all omis-
sions of counsel do not arise to the dignity of a denial of due process
.... "72 The court based its conclusion on the fact "that defense
counsel and defendant were well aware that the prosecution was
proceeding on an aiding and abetting theory17 . even though the
information did not specifically charge defendant under the ac-
countability statute. Consequently, the failure by defense counsel
to object specifically to the instructions did not render the trial a
"farce or mockery," nor did such action fail to meet the customary
standard: performance of a lawyer "with ordinary training and skill
in the criminal law.' ' 7
Moreover, the court admonished the prosecution in dicta for
not charging the defendant under the accountability statute:
While the record is clear that no surprise existed, this Court does
not condone the method used by the state in charging the defen-
dant. If the state planned-to charge the defendant with aiding and
abetting, in proper practice it should have done so from the onset."
As notice and avoidance of surprise are the key considerations in
such cases, the court carefully scrutinized the facts to determine
whether sufficient notice had been given.
In State v. Thompson, the court considered the propriety of a
prosecutor's closing remarks. May a prosecutor comment on the
disastrous effects the defendant's perjured remarks might have on
an innocent man? If the remarks made during closing argument
constitute "a comment on the gravity of the crime charged ..
they are admissible:"
Generally, the gravity of the crime charged, the volume of the
evidence, credibility of the witnesses, inferences to be drawn from
various phases of evidence, and legal principles involved, to be
presented in instructions to the jury, are all matters within the
proper scope of argument.78
The court concluded that the marks did not constitute a personal
commentary on the defendant's perjured statements but did explain
to the jury the testimony and transcript of a prior criminal proceed-
ing.
72. Id. at 1054.
73. Id. See also State v. Murphy, - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1103 (1977).
74. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
75. State v. Murphy, - Mont. -, -, 570 P.2d 1103, 1105 (1977), as referred to
in Murphy v. Crist, No. 14209 (Mont. July 13, 1978) (35 St. Rep. 1054 (1978)).
76. - Mont. _ 576 P.2d 1105 (1978).
77. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 1109.
78. Id.
[Vol. 40
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The third case, State v. Bain,7 involved repeated attempts by
the prosecutor to introduce inadmissible evidence regarding de-
fendant's prior criminal status. The court stated:
Willful attempts by counsel to place excluded evidence before the
jury may result not only in a mistrial, but reversal.
. . . In determining whether such questions are so prejudicial
[as] to . . . require reversal, this Court must look (1) to the rea-
sonable inference to be drawn from the questions, and (2) whether
such repeated attempts to offer excluded evidence might have con-
tributed to the conviction.8
To determine the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's repeated at-
tempts to introduce excluded evidence, the court considered: (1) the
length of jury deliberation; (2) the fact defendant's character had
never been opened by the defense; and (3) the fact defendant was
convicted of theft rather than the lesser included offense of unau-
thorized use of a motor vehicle."'
E. Double Jeopardy
When does jeopardy attach in a jury trial? Prior to Crist v.
Bretz,82 two rules affected the judicial system in Montana: (1) in the
federal court system, jeopardy attached when the jury was empa-
neled and sworn; and (2) in the Montana court system, jeopardy
attached after the first witness was sworn.8 The United States Su-
preme Court in Bretz resolved the question of time and attachment
by holding that jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and
sworn.84
In adopting the federal rule, the Court raised "the defendant's
'valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal'"
to a constitutionally guaranteed right.85 The Court dismissed Mon-
tana's argument that the federal rule merely represented a rule of
convenience.
[The federal rule] is a rule that both reflects and protects the
defendant's interest in retaining a chosen jury. We cannot hold
that this rule . . . is only at the periphery of double jeopardy
79. - Mont. -, 575 P.2d 919 (1978).
80. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 923.
81. Id.
82. 437 U.S. 28 (1978), rev'g Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1976).
83. Id. at 29. See MCA § 46-11-503(4) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-
1711(3)(d) (Supp. 1977)). The court held that § 46-11-503(4) cannot constitutionally be ap-
plied to a jury trial.
84. 437 U.S. at 38.
85. Id. at 36.
1979]
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concerns. These concerns - the finality of judgments, the
,,,,,,,,l~,on of harassing exposure to he ha-rrowing experience of
a criminal trial, and the value right to continue with the chosen
jury - have combined to produce the federal law that in a jury
trial jeopardy attached when the jury is empaneled and sworn.
The leading case cited as authority for the federal rule is Downum
v. United States.87 Downum, however, did not expressly discuss
when jeopardy should attach; counsel for the parties conceded that
jeopardy attached when the jury was empaneled and sworn."
The Court's reliance on the defendant's "valued right to have
his trial completed by a particular tribunal" ign.ores the meaning of
the entire sentence from which this standard was excerpted. The
complete sentence written by Justice Black in Wade v. Hunter'
reads:
What has been said is enough to show that a defendant's valued
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in
some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair
trials designed to end in just judgments.10
This sentence suggests the defendant's valued right is not absolute,
but conditional. Therefore, concern for federalism and state experi-
mentation could subordinate this right, especially when the time
distinction between when a jury is empaneled and sworn and when
the first witness is sworn is minimal." Justice Powell in his dissent
admonished the majority for constitutionally fixing the exact time
jeopardy should attach. In his opinion, the federal rule should only
be a federal supervisory rule because the rule is not based on any
doctrinal reasoning reaching constitutional dimensions.' 2 Neverthe-
less, the Court in Crist overlooked these concerns and explicitly held
that jeopardy in jury proceedings attaches when the jury is empa-
neled and sworn. 3 In non-jury proceedings, jeopardy attaches after
the first witness is sworn."
Will review of a pretrial acquittal place a defendant in double
jeopardy? In State v. Hagerud,"1 the supreme court allowed review
and stated: "[In an action regarding mental disease excluding re-
86. Id. at 38.
87. 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
88. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. at 48, n. 14 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. 336 U.S. 684 (1949).
90. Id. at 689.
91. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. at 40-53 (Powell, J., dissenting). This argument is implicit
in Justice Powell's dissenting opinion.
92. Id. at 49.
93. Id. at 38.
94. Srfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975).
95. - Mont. , 570 P.2d 1131 (1978).
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sponsibility the] defendant was never once placed in jeopardy be-
cause he was never subjected to the possibility of conviction of the
crime charged.""' The court followed the reasoning of Serfass v.
United States:7
Although an accused may raise defenses or objections before trial
which are "capable of determination without the trial of the gen-
eral issue," and although he must raise certain other defenses or
objections before trial, in neither case he is "subjected to the haz-
ards of trial and possible conviction.""
A defendant must be "put to trial before the trier of facts, whether
the trier be a jury or a judge" before jeopardy attaches."
Yet in another aspect of double jeopardy, the court in State v.
Zimmerman's corrected an earlier decision in the same case which
had allowed a second prosecution in state court after the defendant
had been tried, convicted and sentenced on virtually the same facts
and for the same criminal episode in federal court.' After referring
extensively to a critical analysis of the earlier decision in a law
review article, the court held the facts and offenses of the state
prosecution arose out the same transaction as that considered in the
federal prosecution: "Section [46-11-504] fits this case like a glove
and bars the subsequent state prosecution after the initial federal
conviction. '"10 1 Zimmerman and MCA § 46-11-504 (1978)10 abrogate
the "separate sovereignties" doctrine in Montana, which allows
96. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1137.
97. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
98. Id. at 391.
99. Id. at 388. (citing United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)).
100. - Mont. - , 573 P.2d 174 (1977).
101. See Elison, Criminal Procedure, 38 MoNT. L. Rav. 27, 57 (1977) for a critical review
of the first decision, State ex rel. Zimmerman v. District Court, 168 Mont. 289, 541 P.2d 1215
(1975).
102. State v. Zimmerman, -Mont. at -, 573 P.2d at 179. MCA § 46-11-502 (1978)
(formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1711(4) (Supp. 1977)) states:
When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state
and of the United States or another state or of two courts of separate, overlapping,
or concurrent jurisdiction in this state, a prosecution in any such other jurisdicton
is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state under the following circumstances:
(1) The first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined
in [§ 46-11-503] and the subsequent prosecution is based on an offense arising out
of the same tranaction.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the complaint had been
filed on a misdemeanor charge or after the information had been filed or the indict-
ment found on a felony charge, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for
the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed, or vacated; and the acquittal,
final order, or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a
fact which must be established for conviction of the offense for which the defendant
is subsequently prosecuted.
103. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-171(4) (Supp. 1977).
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both the state and federal governments to prosecute an offender for
the same offe-nse.10
A defendant, however, may be charged, convicted and sent-
enced for two distinct criminal offenses arising out of the same
transaction. In State v. Davis," the supreme court allowed the
district court to charge, convict, and consecutively sentence two
defendants for attempted escape and criminal mischief. The court
relied on a prior precedent:
A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each
statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not ex-
empt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the
other. 10
The court never referred to MCA § 46-11-502 (1978),'0 which ex-
pressly states:
When the same transaction may establish the commission of more
than one offense, a person charged with such conduct may be
prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be con-
victed of more than one offense if:
(1) one offenge is included in the other;
(2) one offense consists only of a conspiracy or other form of
preparation to commit the other;
(3) inconsistent findings of fact are required to establish the
commission of the offenses;
(4) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit
a designated kind of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a
specific instance of such conduct; or
104. The United States Supreme Court first formulated the doctrine in United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922):
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable
of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory .... Each
government is determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity
is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state sover-
eignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punishable
by both.
The Court reaffirmed this doctrine in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) and
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959), even though the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution provides "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " The basic rationale for the doctrine is that the defen-
dant is "a citizen of two governments, each of which has separate interests to protect and is
independently responsible for the enforcement of its laws. To outlaw successive prosecutions
... would enable one sovereign to interfere with the administration of the other's criminal
law." Comment, Double Prosecution By State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise
in Federalism, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1538, 1540 (1967).
105. - Mont. -. , 577 P.2d 375 (1978).
106. Id. at __, 577 P.2d at 377.
107. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1711(2) (Supp. 1977).
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(5) the offense is defined to prohibit a continuing course of
conduct and the defendant's course of conduct was interrupted,
unless the law provides that the specific periods of such conduct
constitute separate offenses.
Although the court reached the proper conclusion by relying on the
prior precedent, it missed an opportunity to apply specific statutory
law to a procedural question.
F. Guilty Pleas
Before a court will accept a guilty plea, the plea must be made
(1) voluntarily and (2) understandingly and intelligently by the
defendant.0 8 To assure that the plea meets these essential require-
ments a court should consider the totality of the circumstances.""
In State v. Azure, "o the Montana Supreme Court held that a district
judge must ask the defendant whether he understands the charges
filed against him, the elements of the crime, the possible alternative
charges and the maximum sentences for all charges."' This colloquy
must occur prior to the judge accepting the defendant's plea, be-
cause once he pleads guilty he waives several constitutional rights:
(1) the right to counsel; (2) the privilege against self-incrimination;
(3) the right to a jury trial; and (4) the right to confront one's
accusers."' If the district judge fails to conduct such a colloquy, the
supreme court will vacate the earlier judgment and sentence and
allow the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea if he has properly
submitted a motion to the district court."3
MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1978) 4 provides in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and should not
accept the plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is
voluntary with an understanding of the charge.
When considering the voluntariness of the plea, the court must
examine the possibility of threats, misrepresentations or bribes by
either the court, the prosecutor or the defense counsel before accept-
ing the defendant's guilty plea."5
108. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
109. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
110. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 179 (1977).
111. Id. at __, 573 P.2d at 183.
112. Boyking v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), specifically considered the rights
enumerated in (2) through (4). Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requires the right
enumerated in (1).
113. See e.g., State v. Azur, - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 179 (1977).
114. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1606(e).
115. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
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A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea."' In State ex ret.
Gladue v. District Court, 117 the court reversed as an abuse of discre-
tion a district court order refusing to allow a withdrawal of a guilty
plea. The defendant had maintained his innocence up to the time
of his initial plea and then changed it because of his counsel's influ-
ence. The court stated:
A plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary where it appears that
the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fun-
damental mistake or serious mental condition that the possibility
exists he may have plead [sic] guilty to a crime of which he is
innocent."'
If the guilty plea creates any doubt as to its voluntariness, the court
said, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant."'
In a subsequent case, State v. Lewis,"* which involved a defen-
dant who wished to withdraw his guilty plea, the court held, inter
alia, that if the district judge conducts a detailed colloquy on the
record, the request for withdrawal will not "be given any degree of
credence" if the defendant's motion is an attempt "to, [in effect],
receive a lighter sentence."12' The colloquy in Lewis addressed: (1)
the charge; (2) the conviction; (3) the sentence; (4) the defendant's
state of mind; (5) the competency of counsel; and (6) submission of
a plea in open court.11 The Court in Lewis implicitly affirmed the
general practice which liberally allows the withdrawal of guilty
pleas prior to sentencing, but which rarely allows the withdrawal
after sentencing if the judge conducts the proper colloquy.
In State v. Coleman,'2 the defendant claimed reversible error
because the state refused to plea bargain and refused to accept his
offered guilty plea. The court summarily dismissed defendant's ar-
gument regarding the court's failure to accept his guilty plea: "The
acceptance of a guilty plea to a charged offense is within the discre-
tion of the trial court.' ' 24 MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1978)25 mandates
116. MCA § 46-16-105(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1902) provides
in pertinent part:
At any time before or after judgment the court may, for good cause shown,
permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.
117. - Mont. -, 575 P.2d 65 (1978).
118. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 66.
119. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 67 (citing State v. Casaras, 104 Mont. 404, 413, 66 P.2d
774, 778 (1937)).
120. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 346 (1978).
121. Id. at __, 582 P.2d at 352.
122. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 349. See Judge Allen's detailed colloquy, - Mont. at
__9 582 P.2d at 439.
123. - Mont. -, 579 P.2d 732 (1978).
124. Id. at -, 579 P.2d at 745.
125. MCA § 46-12-204(2) (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1606(e)) pro-
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such discretion. The court also dismissed the defendant's argument
that the prosecutor failed to plea bargain with him. Constitutional
guarantees do not require plea bargaining; they merely allow it
within certain standards.'" Consequently, a defendant may be de-
nied the opportunity to plea bargain with the prosecution as well as
have his guilty plea refused by the court. Moreover, if a formal plea
is not completed during the arraignment, such irregularity will not
affect subsequent legal action if the defendant fails to object before
proceeding to trial and his substantial rights are not prejudiced by
such irregularity."7
If the plea bargaining occurs in an open give-and-take process
which allows the defendant to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer,
the defendant probably will not be able to claim prosecutorial
vindictiveness. 2  The United States Supreme Court held in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes'12 that where a prosecutor "openly pre-
sented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing
trial and facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecu-
tion" the defendant could not claim deprivation of any constitu-
tional guarantee. 30 In Hayes, the prosecutor had recommended
during post-arraignment conferences a sentence of five years if the
defendant would plead guilty; the prosecution informed the defen-
dant that if a plea of not guilty was entered, he would seek a new
indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. The Court
reasoned that "in the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no
such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is
free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer."'' The give-and-take
process precludes the unilateral imposition of a criminal penalty
through prosecutorial vindictiveness.12
vides in pertinent part: "The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty ....
126. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
127. State v. Petko, - Mont. - ... 581 P.2d 425, 429 (1978). See MCA § 46-
12-206 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1608):
No iregularity which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant shall
affect the validity of any proceeding in the cause if the defendant pleads to the
charge or proceeds to trial without objecting to such irregularity.
The Revised Commission Comment to § 46-12-206 states:
The real question in all criminal cases on appeal is whether the substantial
rights of the defendant have been adversely affected. The purpose of the section is
to prevent reversal where the court has strayed from the procedure set forth, but
the failure has not hindered the defense.
The burden is upon the defendant to object if any irregularity in connection
with the arraignment is going to affect his defense. This does not override any of
the defendant's substantial constitutional rights even though not objected to.
128. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978).
129. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
130. Id. at 365.
131. Id. at 363.
132. Id. at 362.
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Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, argued that little
difference can exist between vindictiveness which prevents the de-
fendant from exercising a legal right to attack his original conviction
and which occurs during the give-and-take process of plea bargain-
ing.3 3 Vindictiveness occurs in either situation regardless of the
label attached to the process.
Hayes expressly overruled a Sixth Circuit case, Hayes v.
Cowan, ,3' in which the court considered the prosecutor's action dur-
ing plea bargaining to be per se violative of defendant's due process
rights. This reversal is significant in Montana as the Montana Su-
preme Court relied in part upon the Sixth Circuit case in deciding
State v. Sather. ' Sather remains technically sound, however, as
the court considered both federal and state grounds in reaching its
result. In Sather, the court held that a prosecutor could not wait
until plea bargaining failed and then, twenty-four hours before trial,
threaten to impose the persistent felony offender statute if the de-
fendant refused to plea guilty. This action was characterized by the
court as vindictive and a deprivation of the defendant's due pro-
cess.'
3
In a subsequent case, State v. Gallaher7 the court considered
the Bordenkircher case, but did not find it applicable to the facts
in Gallaher. The court also distinguished the facts in Gallaher from
Sather on the following three grounds: (1) no agreed proceeding
statement existed as in Sather; (2) no certified docket entries ex-
isted as in Sather; and (3) no documentation existed showing the
prosecutor's evaluation of the case and his proposed increased sent-
ence as in Sather.1'3 Furthermore, the disparity between the bar-
gained sentence and the actual sentence did not seem so unfair as
to require a finding that a due process violation has occurred.' 3'
G. Probation and Parole
In Lopez v. Crist,'0 a case of first impression, the court consid-
ered the issue of "whether a parolee who, after a full revocation
hearing, has been found by the Board of Pardons not to have vio-
lated his parole may nevertheless be confined pending submission
of an acceptable new parole plan.""' The court in Lopez recognized
133. Id. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976).
135. - Mont. -, 564 P.2d 1306 (1978).
136. Id. at -, 564 P.2d at 1311.
137. - Mont. -, 580 P.2d 930 (1978).
138. Id. at __ 580 P.2d at 934.
139. Id.
140. - Mont. -, 578 P.2d 312 (1978).
141. Id. at -, 578 P.2d at 314.
[Vol. 40
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 40 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/8
LEGAL MECHANICS
"the importance of parole status" and the liberty associated with
that status and held that if insufficient evidence existed to justify
revocation of parole, the parolee's "indeterminate liberty" must be
restored." ' The court observed that if the parolee is returned to
prison after a parole revocation based on insufficient evidence,
"[t]he parole authorities have . . .an affirmative duty to actively
aid [the parolee] in developing a realistic, acceptable plan. '"3 In
Lopez, the parolee in good faith had submitted two parole plans
which the board rejected without recommending changes.'4 The
court, however, did not specify how the parole board should affirma-
tively aid the parolee except to require the board's "total coopera-
tion and active efforts. . . in finding an acceptable parole plan.""15
In a related matter, the court held that for revocation of a
deferred or suspended sentence, "the trial judge must have, and the
record must reflect that he has, substantially correct information
concerning the defendant before he can affect a defendant's sub-
stantial rights by entering an order of revocation.' 4 In State v.
Knapp, "4, the district court revoked the defendant's deferred impo-
sition of sentence when he failed to regularly report to his probation
officer. Although the judge has discretion to revoke a deferred sent-
ence on the gounds of failure to report, such discretion should be
sparingly used.14 8
In order to exercise his discretion, the judge must know "who
the defendant is and the charges upon which the state is seeking to
have a sentence imposed. ' ' "4 In Knapp, the judge revoked the de-
ferred sentence and then sentenced the defendant on charges for
which he had not been convicted. Only after prolonged discussion
did the judge correct the error. The court observed: "[A] defendant
can be prejudiced as much by mistaken assumptions concerning his
criminal background when a deferred sentence is revoked, as he can
when he is sentenced."' 50 The judge, therefore, must have
"substantially correct information" regarding the defendant, as ver-
ified by the record, before an order of revocation can be entered
affecting the defendant's substantial rights. 5'
142. Id.
143, Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. State v. Knapp, - Mont..... 570 P.2d 1138, 1140 (1977).
147. - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1138 (1977).
148. Id. at , 570 P.2d at 1140.
149. Id.
150. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1141.
151. Id.
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H. Sentence and Review
"A sentencing judge may not conduct his own presentence in-
vestigation by privately interviewing persons he believes to know
more than they have told; . . . he must delegate that responsibility
to other officials." ' In State v. Stewart, "53 the court observed that
where the judge personally interviewed witnesses who had testified
during the trial, the judge overstepped "his legitimate role as a fact
finder [and became] a private fact gatherer."'54 "The judge, by this
process, . . . unwittingly [became] intimately connected with the
accusatory process," diminishing any semblance of impartiality. 55
Although the judge in selecting the appropriate sentence must learn
all he can about the defendant, he must not abuse his discretionary
information-gathering power by privately and informally retrying
the case. 156
In three recent cases the court considered whether a district
court could impose a fine as a reasonable condition of probation
when the applicable statute did not authorize such a fine or when
no reasonable relationship existed between the fine and the crime.
In State v. Babbit, 57 the court recognized the discretionary power
of the judge, but disallowed the imposition of any fine:
Imposition of fine is the passing of a sentence and not the suspen-
sion of sentence. The fact that the court terms it a condition of
probation does not render it any the less a sentence. 58
The court added: "We fail to find a reasonable association between
the fine imposed. . . and the crime committed. Neither do we find
it to be a reasonable or necessary condition of probation or for pro-
tection of the public."'' Therefore, the imposition of a fine in this
instance was "a nullity and of no force or effect."' 60
In State v. Petho,"' a case factually similar to Babbit except
that Petko was sentenced after a jury trial rather than after a guilty
plea, the court also held the fine a nullity. In State v. Gripps, "I the
court applied the Babbit rule to a fine imposed as a condition for a
152. State v. Stewart, - Mont. -, -, 573 P.2d 1138, 1148 (1977).
153. - Mont. -, 573 P.2d 1138 (1977).
154. Id. at -, 573 P.2d at 1148.
155. Id.
156. Id. at -, 573 P.2d at 1148-49.
157. - Mont. __, 574 P.2d 998 (1978).
158. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 1001 (citing State v. Pitts, 26 Ariz. App. 390, 391, 548 P.2d
1202, 1203 (1976)).
159. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 1002.
160. Id.
161. - Mont. -, 581 P.2d 425 (1978).
162. - Mont. 582 P.2d 312 (1978).
[Vol. 40
20
Montana Law Review, Vol. 40 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol40/iss1/8
LEGAL MECHANICS
suspended sentence and also held the fine to be a nullity. The defen-
dants in Cripps were charged for offenses which allowed a statutory
fine. The court stated:
At sentencing the court could, among other things, suspend execu-
tion of sentence upon the [condition of MCA § 46-18-201(1)(b)
(1978) ], impose a fine as provided by law, or impose a combination
of both. We do not think, however, that [section 46-18-201(1)(b)]
in itself, allows the sentencing court to make payment of a fine a
condition to suspend execution of the sentence."'
Therefore, in these three cases, the court specifically expressed its
willingness to invalidate the imposition of a fine as a condition of
probation.
In a post-conviction relief hearing, the defendant must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief, accord-
ing to In the Matter of Jones.' That case involved a petition for
post-conviction relief wherein the defendant requested that a dis-
trict judge be prohibited from imposing a heavier sentence for possi-
ble perjury in another person's trial. The court adopted the general
rule that in rendering a sentence, a judge may consider the defen-
dant's perjured statements in another trial without such considera-
tion representing a conviction for another crime without normal
procedural safeguards.6 5 Therefore,
[w]hile the sentencing judge may take into account his belief that
the defendant was not candid with the court this is to be distin-
guished from the rule that a sentence may not be augmented be-
cause a defendant refuses to confess or invokes his privilege against
self-incrimination.16
Before imposing a heavier sentence for possible perjury or lack of
163. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 320. MCA § 46-18-201(1)(b) (1978) (formerly codified at
R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2206(1)(b) (Supp. 1977)) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Whenever a person has been found guilty of an offense upon a verdict or
a plea of guilty, the court may:
(b) suspend execution of sentence up to the maximum sentence allowed for
the particular offense. The sentencing judge may impose on the defendant any
reasonable restrictions during the period of suspended sentence. Such reasonable
restrictions may included:
(i) jail base release;
(ii) jail time not exceeding 90 days;
(iii) conditions for probation;
(iv) restitution;
(v) any other reasonable conditions considered necessary for
rehabilitation or for the protection of society;
(vi) any combination of the above.
164. - Mont - ... 578 P.2d 1150, 1152 (1978).
165. Id. at _, 578 P.2d at 1153.
166. Id. at __, 578 P.2d at 1154.
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candor, the district judge may wish to consider several questions:
(1) Is possible perjury the only factor for imposing a heavier
sentence?
(2) Could a separate criminal proceeding for perjury be
initiated?
(3) Did defendant's possible perjury obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice?
(4) Will defendant's procedural rights suffer?
(5) Is perjury a valid indicator of the defendant's capacity
for reformation or repentance?
(6) Is it possible defendant did not commit perjury but hisdemeanor suggests it?
(7) Is the basis for the court's belief of possible perjury
based on defendant's refusal to confess or invocation of his self-
incrimination privilege?
(8) Is the court's belief of perjury based on logical or personal
biases?
Justice Shea, in his dissenting opinion, stated that questions
similar to the above may be the minimum requisite questions that
should be considered by a district judge. 67
How much identification is required before the state may im-
pose the persistent felony offender statutes?168 In State v. Radi,111
the court stated that mere certified records of a prior judgment and
of prison records showing dates of incarceration were insufficient to
identify the defendant. 70 Assertions that the defendant has ap-
peared before the same judge in an unrelated case also were deemed
insufficient.' The prosecutor must prove by competent evidence,
the court said, that the defendant is the person who committed the
prior felony.7 2 The court also said that a presentence investigation
is required regardless of the evidence that indicates the defendant
is a persistent felony offender. 73
The court in Radi also adopted the minority rule that a prior
167. Id. at -, 578 P.2d at 1155-61 (Shea, J., dissenting). See also Comment, The
Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L. J. 204,
211-17 (1956).
168. See MCA §§ 46-18-501 through 46-18-503 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947,
§§ 95-1506 through 1507 (Supp. 1977)). These statutes allow the state to present evidence of
a prior felony conviction before an offender's guilty plea or trial on a subsequent felony charge.
If the offender is convicted on the subsequent felong charge and the court finds that any of
the allegations regarding the prior conviction are true, then the court may not defer or
suspend the first 5 years of the sentence except under certain circumstances.
169. - Mont. __, 578 P.2d 1169 (1978).
170. Id. at ., 578 P.2d at 1180.
171. Id.
172. Id. at , 578 P.2d at 1180-81.
173. Id. at _, 578 P.2d at 1182.
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conviction may be considered in applying the persistent felony of-
fender statute even though that conviction is pending on appeal at
the time of sentencing for the subsequent crime.' If the pending
conviction is reversed, MCA §§ 46-18-501 and 46-18-502 (1978)'"7
become applicable: "[A] reversal [on appeal] granting a new trial
would erase the previous conviction and eliminate the bases to sent-
ence [the] defendant as a persistent felony offender." ''7 Conse-
quently, the court reaches the same result as the majority if the
prior conviction is reversed; if the prior conviction is affirmed, the
judicial system is spared time and expense while preserving the
defendant's rights.
In State v. Nelson, ,7  the court considered whether evidence of
two prior convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquors must be presented at trial for the third offense rather
than at sentencing. "The State, upon trial, only has to prove the
present offense. If they succeed, then the matter of the prior convic-
tions is considered in setting the sentence."7' The procedure used
in a case involving the third offense of driving while under the
174. Id. at - , 578 P.2d at 1181.
175. Formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1507(1) (Supp. 1977).
176. - Mont. at __, 578 P.2d at 1181. MCA § 46-18-501 (1978) (formerly codified
at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1507(1) (Supp. 1977)) provides:
A "persistent felony offender" is an offender who has previously been convicted
of a felony and who is presently being sentenced for a second felony committed on
a different occasion than the first. An offender is considered to have been previously
convicted of a felony if:
(1) the previous felony conviction was for an offense committed in this state
or any other jurisidiction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess
of 1 year could have been imposed;
(2) less than 5 years have elapsed between the commission of the present
offense and either;
(a) the previous felony conviction; or
(b) the offender's release on parole or otherwise from prison or other commit-
ment imposed as a result of the previous felony conviction; and
(3) the offender has not been pardoned on the ground of innocence and the
conviction has not been set aside in a postconviction hearing.
MCA § 46-18-502 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1507(2), (3) (Supp. 1977))
provides:
(1) A persistent felony offender shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a
term of not less than 5 years or more than 100 years if he was 21 years of age or
older at the time of the commission of the present offense.
(2) Except as provided in section 46-18-222, the imposition or execution of the
first 5 years of a sentence imposed under subsection (1) may not be deferred or
suspended.
These sections have been amended and recodified since the Radi discussion; they are not
identical to the section and subsections used in Radi.
177. - Mont. -, 583 P.2d 435 (1978).
178. Id. at - , 583 P.2d at 437.
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influence of intoxicating liquor is analogous to the process used in
sentencing repeat felony offenders."
I. Discovery
State v. Booke'80 reaffirmed prior case law which allows addi-
tions to a witness list upon a showing of good cause any time after
the arraignment and up to the time of the verdict.' ' If either party
is allowed to add to the witness list on the day of the trial, the other
party should immediately request a continuance rather than object
to the addition on grounds of surprise.8 2 An allegation of surprise
may be very difficult to support, particularly when the additional
witnesses are the victims of the crime who have been recuperating
under medical care, as was the case in Booke.10
If discovery motions are used by either party, the requests
should be very specific. In State v. Cripps, 81 the defendant submit-
ted the following request:
[Flor any written or .recorded statements of any person whom the
prosecutor intended to call as witnesses at the trial; for any written
or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements
made by the defendants; and for any relevant or material informa-
tion which had been provided by an informant.'"
This request lacked sufficient specificity to require a prosecutor to
disclose a witness's oral statement.' Any objection to testimony
which could have been obtained through discovery must be made
in a timely manner; otherwise the objecting party has waived the
right. 7 After objectionable testimony is introduced, the objecting
179. Id. (citing State v. Loudermilk, 221 Kan. 157, 161, 557 P.2d 1228, 1233 (1976)).
180. - Mont. -, 583 P.2d 405 (1978).
181. Id. at -, 583 P.2d at 409 (citing State v. Campbell, 160 Mont. 111, 500 P.2d
801 (1972)). MCA § 46-15-301 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1803 (Supp.
1977)) provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal cases originally triable in district court the following rules apply:
(1) For the purpose of notice only and to prevent surprise, the prosecution
shall furnish to the defendant and file with the clerk of the court at the time of
arraignment a list of the witnesses the prosecution intends to call. The prosecution
may, any time after arraignment, add to the list the names of any additional
witnesses upon a showing of good cause. The list shall include the names and
addresses of the witnesses. This subsection does not apply to rebuttal witnesses.
182. Id. at -, 583 P.2d at 410.
183. Id. at -, 583 P.2d at 409-10.
184. - Mont. -, 582 P.2d 312 (1978).
185. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 316.
186. Id. at -, 582 P.2d at 317.
187. Id.
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party should immediately move to strike such evidence; the failure
to make such a motion will constitute a waiver. 8
J. Appeal Procedure
When a defendant is committed for psychiatic treatment fol-
lowing a pretrial hearing in the defense of mental defect excluding
responsibility, the substantive effect of the court's action is acquit-
tal, not dismissal.' The state under MCA § 46-20-103 (1978) has
no "right of direct appeal.""1° The state alternatively argued in State
v. Hagerud"' that if direct appeal is not permissible, a writ of super-
visory control should be granted." 2 A writ of supervisory control is
appropriate when: (1) the district court is acting within its jurisdic-
tion, (2) but by a mistake of law or willfull disregard of it causing a
gross injustice and (3) no appeal exists or a remedy of appeal is
inadequate."3 The court, in allowing the writ, considered the district
court's action improper because the parties contested the mental
defect. Therefore, the district court should have held more than a
summary pretrial proceeding to resolve the conflict." 4
In State v. Mortenson, "I the court considered "whether the
time for appeal from a justice court conviction runs from the date
of verbal pronouncement of judgment in open court, or from the
date the judgment is executed by the court and received by the
defendant." '" The statutory time limit controlling appeals "runs
188. Id. See WHARTON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 380-90 (12th ed. 1975) for a discussion
of the general rules regarding discovery. Montana appears to be in the majority.
189. See State v. Hagerud, - Mont. ., -, 570 P.2d 1131, 1135 (1977).
190. MCA § 46-20-103 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2403 (Supp.
1977)) provides:
(1) Except as otherwise specifically authorized, the state may not appeal in
a criminal case.
(2) The state may appeal from any court order of judgment the substantive
effect of which results in:
(a) dismissing a case;
(b) modifying or changing the verdict as provided iin 46-16-702(3)(c);
(c) granting a new trial;
(d) quashing an arrest or search warrant;
(e) suppressing evidence;
(f) suppressing a confession or admission; or
(g) granting or denying change of venue.
191. - Mont. -, 570 P.2d 1131 (1977).
192. Id. at __ 570 P.2d at 1135.
193. Id. See MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2; MONT. R. App. Civ. P. 17.
194. Id. at -, 570 P.2d at 1137.
195. - Mont. - , 574 P.2d 581 (1978).
196. Id. at - , 574 P.2d at 581. MCA § 46-17-311 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M.
1947, 11 95-2009(2) (Supp. 1977)) provides in pertinent part:
(2) The defendant may appeal to the district court by giving written notice
of his intention to appeal within 10 days after judgment.
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from the date of oral pronouncement." 9 ' To meet this deadline, the
appeal papers must be "actually received" by the proper official
"within the time fixed for filing."'98
In State ex rel. Graveley v. District Court,' the court strictly
construed the time requirement for criminal appeals. To appeal a
criminal case to the supreme court, notice must be submitted to the
court within sixty days after the judgment's rendition. 00 If this re-
quirement is not met, the court lacks "jurisidiction to hear the
appeal."201
Three cases specifically considered the writ of habeas corpus
and its applicability to appeals: Bretz v. Crist;202 State ex rel. Grave-
ley v. District Court;0 3 and In re Hart.20 1 In Bretz, the court reaf-
firmed an earlier rule that "any error in a criminal trial, which is
reviewable on appeal from the conviction, will not be considered in
a habeas corpus proceeding. 20 5 A writ of habeas corpus and a writ
of appeal cannot be pursued simultaneously on the same issue.
Hart provides a lengthy historical discussion of the writ of ha-
beas corpus. The court concluded: "The only way to protect persons
charged with a crime and preserve the speedy nature of the writ is
to recognize that it is dual in nature, viz.-civil as well as crimi-
nal."0 6 As the writ is an original writ, both the district court and
the supreme court may issue it.2 07 If the writ is denied in district
court, such denial does not divest the supreme court of jurisdiction
to issue a writ upon a second application.20 1
In Hart the court applied this rule to criminal extradition pro-
ceedings; Graveley applied it to a criminal proceeding, "where the
issue to be determined [was] the freedom of [the] petitioner, or
the legality of petitioner's detention." 0 9 In child custody cases, how-
ever, an appeal does lie from from a district court's denial of the writ
197. - Mont. at __, 574 P.2d at 582.
198. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 582 [citing what is now MCA § 46-20-203 (1978) (formerly
codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2413(a))].
199. - Mont. - , 582 P.2d 775 (1978).
200. MCA § 46-20-203 (1978) (formerly codified at R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2405(e)) provides:
"An appeal from a judgment may be taken within 60 days after its rendition."
201. - Mont. at - , 582 P.2d at 777.
202. No. 14209 (Mont. July 13, 1978) (35 St. Rep. 990 (1978)).
203. - Mont. , 582 P.2d 775 (1978).
204. - Mont. -' 583 P.2d 411 (1978).
205. No. 14209 (Mont. July 13, 1978) (35 St. Rep. at 991) (citing Bubnash v. State, 139
Mont. 645, 367 P.2d 319 (1961)).
206. - Mont. at __, 583 P.2d at 416.
207. Id. at - , 583 P.2d at 414 (citing State v. Booth, 134 Mont. 235, 328 P.2d 1104
(1958)).
208. Id.
209. - Mont. at __, 582 P.2d at 777 (1978).
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because the matter is considered a civil equitable suit and any order
by a district court denying such a writ amounts to a judgment upon
the merits of the case. 21
0
210. In re Hart, - Mont. -, 583 P.2d 411, 414-15 (1978).
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